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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GOLDRING PACKING CO., INC. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
H. & M. CATTLE Co., d/b/a Case No. 
M. & M. DRESSED BEEF CO., 10091 
and GREAT WE'STERN 
PACKING AND CA'TTLE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF· OF DEFENDANT AND APP'ELLAN·T 
GREAT WESTERN PACKING AND 
CATTLE COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF THE NA·T.URE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to determine the amount owed 
by the Goldring Packing Company to the Gr~at 
\\~estern Packing and Cattle Comp·any for killing 
8,151 ewes. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COUR'T 
The Jury found there was an oral contract to 
kill the ewes for fifty cents per head, and Judgment 
in favor of the Goldring Packing Company and 
against Great Western Packing & Cattle Company 
in the accounting was made and entered in the sum 
of $20,377.50. Thereafter, the lower court denied 
the motion of the Great ''r estern Packing & Cattle 
Company for a new trial. 
1 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Great Western Packing & Cattle Company 
wants the judgment of the lower court Vlacated and 
a new trial u·pon the issue of what was the fair and 
reasonable value of the service of Great Western 
Packing and Cattle Company to Goldring Packing 
Company in killing the ewes. 
STATE ME NT OF FACTS 
During the litigation it was stipulated and 
agreed that if Goldring Packing Company obtained 
a judgment against H & M Cattle Company, it 
would be entitled to a ju·dgment against Great West-
ern Packing and Cattle Company in a like amount. 
Hence, the lia·bility of Great Western Packing and 
·C1attle ·Company is to be determined by 'the liability 
of H & M C~attle Company. 
On October 10, 1961 Goldrin·g Packing Com-
pany filed its original complain~t claimin·g it had a 
written contract with the H & M Cattle Company 
requiring H & M C:attle Company to kill ewes for 
50 cents per head, (R. 111). All defendants answer-
ed this 'allegation saying the written contract only 
required them to kill lambs for fifty cents per head 
and did not require them to kill ewes at that price, 
( R. 12). In May of 19'63 Goldring Packing Com-
pany filed an Amended Complaint again claiming 
a written contract to kill ewes for 50 cents per h~ad 
( R. 70) . Again the defendants denied the written 
contract requiring ewes to be killed for 50 cents per 
2 
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head. Exhibit 5 is the written contract, and it also 
was attacherl to the complaint. 
The written contract shows on its face th,at 
when it was signed in August of 1961, the parties 
changed the word "sheep" to "lambs" and that this 
change was noted 'by Max Goldring, president of 
the Goldring Packing Company who placed his ini-
tials uMG" in the lefthand margin opposite the 
name change, and that likewise, the various indi-
vidual indemnitors, which Goldring P·acking Com-
pany required as a condition to ~doing business with 
the H & M Cattle Company, also acknowledged the 
changing of the word "sheep" to "lambs" in para-
graph 2 of the written contract. 
At the pretrials i't was agreed by counsel and 
the court in January of 1964 that ~ewes were not 
lambs (A ewe is a female sheep that has given 
birth to a lamb), and the court took the position 
that under 'the written contract, Great Western 
Packing and Cattle Company was not required to 
kill ewes for 50 cents per !head. Thereafter, at the 
pretri1al in January of 1964, 2·6 months after the 
original law suit was instituted, plaintiff for the 
first time introduced the contention that Goldring 
Packing Company had an oral contract with H & M 
Cattle Company requiring ewes to 'be killed for fifty 
cents per head and introduced the is·sue of 1an oral 
contract into the law suit. (R. 88). The Amended 
Pretrial Order shows tha:t two issue·s were to be 
presented. First, there was an issue as to whether 
3 
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or not there was an oral contract, and second, there 
was 1an issue if there was no oral contract, what 
was the fair and reason.able value of the services 
of Great Western Packing and Cattle Company in 
killing 8,151 head of ewes for Goldring Packing 
Company (R. 91-92)? 
The burden of proving the ortal contract was 
on fue Goldring Packing Company, and 'to prove 
the alleged oral ·agreement, Mr. Henry Hendler, 
the ·general manager of the Goldring Packing ·Com-
pany from Los Angeles, California, was called 'as 
a witness. Mr. Hendler testified that in May of 
1961 he came to Salt Lake from Los Angeles. He 
stated (R. 166) that he was invited to come to Salt 
l.Jake 'City by Ray McFarland a:t the McFarland 
P·acking ·C'Ompany or whatever company was 
opera:ting the plant at the time. Mr. Hendler 
S'aid he had been requested by Rlay McFarland to 
serve on the board of a company (R. 167) to be 
organized to take over the operation of the McFar-
land plant, and he said tha~t in May of 1961 !after 
looking over the deal, he decided he did not want 
to serve on the board of directors of the company 
(R. 169) but that he would like to have the group 
kill sheep for ·him ( R. 169) . Mr. Hendler never did 
testify ·as to who the group was that he m1ade the 
offer to. 
In May of 1961 when the alleged conversation 
took place at the McFarlan·d plant (R. 168), the 
McFarland plant was operated by the McFarland 
4 
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Packing Company. Ray McFarland, the person to 
whom Henry Hendler was speakin·g, was an em-
ployee and officer of McFarl1and Packing Co. 
M1-. Ray McFarland testified ( R. 203) tha;t a 
group was trying to be org1anized to take over 
the operation of the plan't. He said the company 
or group to be organized was Ralston ~Purina Com-
pany, the Goldring Packing ·Company, H & ·M Cattle 
Con1pany, Mink, Inc., and McFarlands. He stated 
that 1at the time he tall\:ed to Mr. Hendler, he was 
representing a group which ·h·ad ndt yet stated a 
name ( R. 204) . 
'Vhen Great Western Packing and Cattle Com-
pany was formed August 4, 1961, Goldring, Mc-
Farlands, Ray McF'arland, and Ralston Purin·a were 
not a part of the new company. Mr.· McF·arland, 
( R. 207) testified that he was not 1an employee of 
Great Western or H & ·M, and th·at he was never 
hired by either of them to ne·gotiate contracts ( R. 
208). 
Mr. McFarland said ·at the time he negotiated 
the cont1·act with Mr. Hendler in May of l'961, he 
bad in mind the group ( R. 206), but 'that ·Great 
'\"estern Packing and Cattle Company, McFarlands, 
himself, Ralston Purina and Goldring were not a 
part of it. 
Returning to Mr. Hendler, he testified ·th'at in 
May of 1961 he had a convergation with Mr. Ray 
jlrFarland at the McFarland plant in Salt Lake 
City. Present at the time of thi's conversation were 
5 
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Mr. Morgan, Mr. Hodson, and Mr. Thayer. Mr. 
Hendler said that the entire agreement was made at 
the May meeting ( R. 184-195) . 
The su'bject of the price for which ewes were 
to be killed was introduced to the jury by Mr. Saper-
stein as follows ( R. 171) : 
Q. And just to be certain that you in-
dicated to ·the jury, sir, at what priee did 
'they agree to kill sheep for you? 
A. Fifty cents per head. 
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, I object to 
that question as calling for a conclusion. I 
think the question should ask wh'at the offi-
cers said; I don't think he should ask what 
they agreed to. 
THE COURT: I think th1a;t 'is correct. 
MR. SAPERSTEIN: I think that is 
right. I will with·draw ·it and re-state it. What 
'did you say to them with re'spect to the price 
thart you expected to pay for their slaughter-
ing of the S'heep? 
THE WITNESS: We c'ame to an 
a'greed price. 
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, I object to 
that as bein·g a conclusion. He dan say what 
the people said, but not that ·they came to 
an agreemen't. 
THE COURT: Well, just indicate what 
was said. 
THE WITNESS: Fifty cents a head 
for sheep, plus edibles and in edibles; and three 
dollars for cattle, plus inedibles. 
6 
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MR. SAPERSTEIN: What response 
did any of the other gentlemen make to that 
proposal of yours? 
THE WITNE'SS: 'There was 'a complete 
agreement. 
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, I object to 
that as not being an answer to the question, 
and a conclusion, and not a statement of what 
they said, 1and I move that it be stricken. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hendler, ju·st a 
minute. Listen to me and maybe I can help 
you. 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
THE COURT: These lawyers object to 
your ·arriving at the conclusion that the jury 
is called upon to make. In other words, the 
jury is going to determine whether fifity cents 
was the amount to be paid, and in order for 
you to answer these questions without objec-
tion just tell what was said by these people, 
and not your conclusion. 
THE WITNESS: All right. Ray Mc-
Farland who wtas the spokesman f9r the group, 
accepted this, and said that would be fine with 
them, and the rest of them all either kept 
quiet or agreed and accepted it (R. 171-17'2). 
On cross examination (R. 182) Mr. Hendler 
testified: 
Q. Now, as I understand, along in May 
of 1961 you had a telephone conversation 
with Ray McFarland? 
A. Yes. 
Q. He, at that time, I think, was presi-
7 
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dent or one of the officers of McFarland, In-
corporated? 
A. No, I don't know wh1a:t his office 
was. He spoke to me as the principal of a 
group 'fuat was custom killing at the pl'ant of 
McFarland, Incorporated. 
Q. Let me 1ask you this : Were you asked 
to serve on the Board of Directors of McFar-
land? 
A. No; it was a company that they had 
recently formed, a firm called 1a name like 
Univers'al Enterprises, or some n!ame rather 
similar to that. 
Q. Some company that Mr. McFarl1and 
was formin'g? 
A. Ray McFarland, Mr. Hodson, Mr. 
Morgan and Mr. Thayer, I believe. 
Q. And this conversation, I think, was 
that you were 'to get '10,000 shares of stock 
in 'tha1t complany to be a director, was it not? 
A. And tell them how to run the busi-
ness. 
Q. And tell them how to run the busi-
ness? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And this happened in May of 1961? 
A. In ap-proximately th'at time. 
Further, Mr. Hendler testified (R. 184): 
Q. You are not relying upon a conver-
sa;tion at some other time or pllace other than 
in that meeting? 
A. No; th1at is the only deal that was 
8 
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made, right in that room. I mean, it is hard 
to pinpoint it exactly. I spent a couple of times 
there ·but we finally came to the ~agreement 
where I said to ~them 1and they said to me and 
we had a complete meeting of the minds. 
Q. This was in May of 1961? 
A. Around tlra:t period, yes. 
Q. And it was Mr. Ray McFarland who 
spoke up 1and said he would kill these ewes 
for fifty cents? 
A. The group agreed among themselves 
and discussed it with me, and I discussed it 
with them. 
Q. But to answer my inquiry: Which 
one person? 
A. I don't remember which one of them; 
they were all speaking to me at that tln1e; 
each one h1ad a little somethin·g to say. 
Exhibit 2 was offered and received into evi-
dence over the objection th·a:t it was hearsay and 
that no foundation 'h:ad ·been laid to show that the 
person who prepared the exhibit had authority to 
set prices for H & M Cattle Com·pany (R. 175). 
Further, objection was made to the admission of 
this exhibit upon the ground tha:t it was immaterial 
(R. 177) and the court received this exhibit which 
showed an isolated instance of a billing from H & 
~I to Goldring Packing Comp·any. 
9 
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At the conclusion of the plaintiff's presenta-
tion of evidence on an oral contract, Jerry Morgan 
and Leonard Thayer were calles as witnesses, and 
they testified that fuere was no conversation in 
M1ay of 1961 with Henry Hendler with regard to 
the cost ( R. 214 & R. 245) of the price of killing 
sheep, but 'that all conversations occurred in a sub-
sequent meeting in late June or early July just 
prior to the prepartation of the written contract (R. 
244). Further, they stated they said- they would 
not kill ewe's for 50 cents per head, and it was for 
tha:t reason that they changed the word, "sheep" 
to "l~ambs" before signing the agreement. 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the 
defendant, Great Western Packing and Cattle Com-
pany, moved to dismiss the claim of Goldring Pack-
ing Company ·based upon the oral contract upon 
the 'ground that as a matter of law, there was no 
oral contract (R. 210), and this motion was denied 
by the court (R. '212). 
To summ1arize who was_ doing what and when, 
the following ·diagrams ·are induded in the statement 
of facts as a guide. 
10 
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<>FFEIU>R 
<;OLI>RING 
PACKING CO. 
IIENRY HENDLER 
( l\ianage1·) 
J{OlJTF~ #1 
DIAGRAM A 
ATTACK 
ACTION BROUGHT ON WRITTEN CONTRACT 
ANI) DEFENDED ON GROU·ND WRITTEN CONTRACT 
l)ID NOT COVER KILLING OF EWES 
(EXHIBIT #5) OFFEREE 
H. & M. ·Cattle Co. Great 
Western 
M·ORGAN'S & Assumed 
GREAT WESTERN 
PACKING AND 
Written Contract 
Included killing of beef & 
lambs H. & M refused to 
sign until word "sheep" HODSONS Liability CATTLE COMPANY 
+_.I changed to "lamb" & Gold- 1+--+ 
ring required guarantors 
by way of supplemental 
agreement. 
Contract dated August 18, 
1961 but negotiated in July 
of 1961 at S'LC. 
Started Operating 
Plant in July of 
1961 
contained 
~ ~ Began Operating 
in Exhibit Plant on August 
#'5 4, 1961 
DEFENSE WAS SUCCESSFUL AS PLAIN'TIFF ADMITTED A EWE WAS NOT A LAMB AND AT 
PRE-TRIAL JUDGE RULED ORAL EVIDENCE W01ULD N·O'T BE A'LLOWED TO MODIFY WRITTEN 
AGREEMENT TO CHAN·GE WORD "LAM~B" TO WORD "'SHEE~P." 
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DIAGRAM B 
DEFENSE 
ROUTE #2 GREAT WESTERN PA·CKING & CATTLE CO. CLAIMED IT WAS 
ENTITLE·D TO RECOVER THE FAIR AND REASONABLE VALUE 
OF ITS SERVICES IN KILLING 'THE EWES, 
GREAT WESTERN PACKING I I GOLDRING PACKING CO. 
AND CATTLE COMPANY Mr. Hendler 
DEFENSE NOT CONSIDERED AS JURY FOU·ND OR-~L CONTRACT TO !{ILL EWES FOR FIFTY 
CENTS PER HEAD. 
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HO liTE ;;:~ 
w 
OFFEROR 
GOLDRING 
PACKING CO. OFFER MA'DE 
I'N CONVER-
MR. I-IENRY 
SATI·ON OF 
....... 
I-I ENDLER ·M:A Y 1961 --, 
(Manager) 
IJIAGRAM C 
ATTACK 
AT PRE-TRIAL TWENTY-SIX MONTHS AFTER FILING 
OF COMPLAINT PLAINTIFF INTRODUCED FOR FIRST 
TIME CLAIM OF ORAL CONTRACT 
EXHIBIT #2 
Admitted over 
objection it 
was Hearsay 
BIL·LINGS FROM H. & 1\I. 
Office Manager 
mistakenly billed a fe\v 
ewes or sheep at 
Mr. Couch not called. 
price of lambs and 
offered to prove 
truth of oral contract 
OFFEREE 
THE GRO(U'P 
Leonard Thayer 
Ray McFarland 
McFarland Packing Co 
Mink, Inc. · 
Ralston Purina 
Vance Hodson 
Wayne Hodson 
Jerry ·Morgan 
Roy Morgan 
H. & M. Cattle Co. 
July 1~._61 l 
H. & M. CATTLE CO. 
Started Operation 
of Plant 
in July 1961 
GREAT WESTERN PACKING 
AND CATTLE CO. 
STARTE·D OPERATION 
OF PLANT 
AUGU·ST 4, 1961 
DEFENSE OF NO ORAL CONTRA·CT F AJlLE·D WHEN JURY FOUND o·FFER MADE TO GRO·UP 
WAS ACCEPTED BY H. & M. ·CATTLE COMPANY. 
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The attached diagram shows that the original 
offer went from the offeror, Goldring Packing Com-
pany, in an oral conversation in May of 1961 to 
the offeree, the Group in May of 1961. The written 
agreement, EXhibit 5, is important because it shows 
th'at a new and different offer in writing was made 
to H & M C!attle Company and that this new offer 
whi~h was accepted required in !addition to other 
terms, guarantors from H & M Cattle Company. 
Following the admission of Exhibit 2, Mr. 
Couch, the party who prepared the billing to Gold-
ring Packin·g Company, was called as a witness~ 
and he testified thlat he had no knowledge of the 
contract price between H & M ·Ca:ttle Company and 
Goldrin·g for the killing of ewes at 50 cents per 
head, and further said that he charged this amount 
because ·he needed money to meet the payroll and 
keep the doors open, and knew 1at le'ast that much 
would be allowed, since they got that price for lambs. 
(R. 2512-257). 
The Great Western Packing and Cattle Com-
pany contended that the fair and reasonable value 
of their services in killing each of the 8,151 ewes 
was $3.00 per head. To support this contention, they 
called as witnesses Abe Guss of the Granite Meat 
& Livestock Company, Fred Pickren of the Midvale 
Packing Com·pany, and Irvin Guss of the Jordan 
Meat & Livestock Company, all of which testified 
that they h·ad been in the business for many years 
and that the fair and reason·able value of the service 
14 
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in killing a ewe was $3.00 or more. Mr. Hendler, 
in rebuttal, testified that an excellent profit could 
be made for killing them ~at 50 cents each. However, 
thi~ ~testimony was not considered by 'the jury, along 
with other testimony respecting the fair ·an·d reason-
able value of the services in killing the sheep, be-
cause they answered the interrogatory (R. 130) 
saying there was an oral contract to kill the ewes 
for 50 cents per head. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW NO ORAL CONTRAIC'T 
\VAS MADE, AS AN OFFER CAN ONLY BE .A:CCE'PT-
ED BY THE OFFEREE. 
Great Western Packing ·and Cattle Company 
contends, since H & M Cattle Company was rwt the 
Group operating the plant in May, 1961, H & M 
Cattle Company received no oral offer to kill any 
e\ves for Goldring Packing ~Company for 50 cents 
per head and did not ·accept any alleged offer. 
In May of 1961 in the conference room at the 
McFarland plant, Hank Hendler, the General Man-
ager of Goldring Packing Company, made an oral 
offer to the McFarland Packing Company or the 
Group operating the McFarland plant. 
At the time this oral offer was alleged to be 
made, Jerry Morgan, Roy Morgan, 1an·d Wayne Hod-
son of the H & M Cattle Company were present, 
15 
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and allegedly heard the offer to the Group an·d re-
mained silent. 
'Thereafter, in July of 1961 H & M Cattle 
Company argues that by taking over the oper1a:tivn 
of the plant the oral offer in May was accepted by 
H & M Cattle Company and that all ewes killed in 
July, August, and September of 196~ were killed 
pursuant to 1an acceptance of the oral offer made to 
the Group in May of t961. 
Great Western Packing and Cattle Company 
claims the only person or party who could have ac-
cepted the offer of Mr. Hendler in May was the 
Group op·erating the plant to whom 'the offer was 
made. 
The Restatement of the Law of Contr1acts, Sec-
tion 54, page 60 reads: "A revocable offer can be 
accepted only by or for the benefit of the person 
to whom it is made." 
In Williston on Contracts, 3rd Ed. Sec. 80, it 
is stated: 
"One of the necessary or essential ele-
ments of 'any proposed contract is 'the person 
with whom the contract is made. Accordingly, 
~an offer made to one person cannot be accept-
ed by another, even though the offeree pur-
ports to assign it. Nor does it make any dif-
ference whether it was important for the 
offeror to contract with one person rather 
than another * * * ." 
In Paige vs. Faure (1920) 229 N.Y. 114, 127 
N.E. 898, it was held an option given a partnership 
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of two, one of whom thereafter assigned to the 
other, could not be exercised by the remaining part-
ners, exercise of an acceptance of the option. 
In Dorsey vs. Strand (1944) 21 Was'h. 2d 217, 
150 P. 2d 702, where a member of a committee sel-
ected to charter a plane endeavored to accept, the 
court held as a m!atter of law there was no a'ccept-
ance of an offer, saying when an offer is made, it 
can be accepted only by the offeree, an·d if accept-
ance is to be man'ifested by doing of ·an act, such 
act must be done by the offeree or there is no con-
tt~act. 
In Gates vs. Petri ( 1H57) 127 Ind. App. Ct. 
Rep. 670, 14·3 N.E. 293 where the record showed 
that the wife of the appellant G~ates did not sign the 
acceptance of the offer or proposition, and there 
was no evidenc that Bernard T. Gates was the agent 
of or authorized to sign for his wife, the court said 
an offer can be accepted only by the offeree, and 
that to constitute a valid contract, the minds of 
the parties must have met on the identities of the 
person with whom they are dealing. In the case 
at bar, the offeror's proposition Wlas to the owners 
of the real estate described, and as both owners did 
not accept, an agreemen't did not occur. The court 
said the acceptance must meet and correspond with 
the offer in every respect, neither falling by or go-
ing beyond the terms proposed, but exactly meeting 
\vith them on all points. 
17 
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In Routzahn vs. Cromer (1959) 220 Md. 65, 
150 Atl: 2d 912, where the name of a purchaser was 
substituted after vendors agreed to sell and the 
change in purchaser was agreed to only by the hus-
band seller, the court held the 'acceptance was un-
enforcible, saying that one of the necessary terms of 
any contract is the name of the person with whom 
it is made, and that consequently, an offer made 
to one cannot be accepted by another. Further, the 
court said a p·arty has a right to contract with whom 
he pleases and that another cannot be thrust upon 
him without his consent. 
In Denver Truck Exchange vs. Perryman 
( 1957) 134 Colo. 586, 307 P. 2d 805, the court fol-
lowed the general rule saying 1an offer can be ac-
cepted only by the one to whom rt is m·ade and 'that 
an offer made to Estlinbaum could only be accepted 
by him, and not Perryman. 
In Schneider vs. Pioneer Trust and Savings 
Bank (1960) 26 Ill. App. 2d 463, 168 N.E. 2d 808, 
where the plaintiffs offered to purch1ase real estate 
from trustee of Bank, who was trustee for William 
Harmon, a sole beneficiary, and the beneficiary, 
Harmon, attempted to accept the offer as the owner, 
and where at 1all times trustee of Bank was unaware 
of negotiations, the court held that under the terms 
of the offer only the Trustee Bank could accept the 
offer and that as Bank did not, there was never a 
valid contract. The court said merely because Har-
mon had power to bring about the result contem-
18 
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plated in the offer does not constitute him an offeree, 
and that to constitute a contract by offer !and accept-
ance, the acceptance must conform exactly to the 
offer. 
In Dar·u vs. Ill artin ( 1961) 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P. 
2d 61, where an offer was made to one Emanuel A. 
Perry but instead an attorney by the name of Daru 
endeavored to accept rt, the court held he could not 
legally accept, saying : 
"When an offer is m·ade to ·a particular 
person or persons, the law is clear that no 
one else can accept the offer and it is not 
transferable to another. 13 C.J.S. 273 Con-
tracts, Section 69, f7 ·C.J .S. Con'tr~acts, Sec-
tion 40, Citing Cases. Neither is there any am-
bigtlity in the offer which woul'd a1low any 
interpretation making plaintiff an offeree. 
The offer was made to Emanuel A. Perry, in 
care of Robert Daru (p~aintiff). This word-
ing definitely excludes plaintiff as a con'tract-
ing party. Therefore, any ·attempted accept-
ance of vendor's offer by plaintiff as a prin-
cipal, either individu1ally or with others, had 
no legal effect in binding vendor to a contract. 
In R. J. Dattm Construction Co. vs. Child ( 1'952) 
122 Utah 194, '247 P. 2d ·817, and in Williams vs. 
Espey (1961) 11 Utah 2d 317, 3158 P. 2d 903, this 
court stated an offer must be unconditionally ac-
cepted, saying to hold otherwise would m'ake ·a con-
tract where there was no meeting of the min·ds. 
As the plaintiff did not prove or offer to prove 
an oral offer to H & M Cattle Company, it is sub-
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mitted that as a matter of law H & M Cattle Com-
pany was not an offeree, and that under the facts 
of this case, there is no oral contract. Further, it is 
submitted that only the Group to whom the alleged 
oral offer of Mr. Hendler was m1ade could accept 
to constitute an oral contract and a meetin·g of the 
minds. 
POINT II. 
AS A MATTER OF ·LAW THE NEGOTIATIONS 
SHIOW THE p A'R'TIES REJE'CTED THE ALLEGED 
MAY, 1961 ORA!L O·FFER. 
Great Western Packin·g and Cattle Company 
contends, as a m!a'tter of law, the complaint, stating 
an action upon a written contract, the Pretrial 
Order ·and Exhibit ·5 show 'the parties did not make 
an oral contract in May, 1961. A:t the pretriJal for 
the first time, the plaintiff contended it had a cause 
of ·action upon an oral contract. Until then its theory 
of recovery was based upon 'a written contract or 
upon a dispute as to wha;t was the fair and reason-
able value of the service of H & M Cattle Company 
in killing the ewes in question. 
The written agreement of August, 1961 is a 
rejection of any oral offer of May of that year. 
Since 'the Goldring Packing Company had its 
attorneys prepare the written agreement of Aug-
ust, 1961 and its president signed and 1accepted the 
change in the agreement showing that it covered 
merely the killing of lambs and not ewes, i't is un-
disputed that a new and different offer was com-
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tnunicated to the H & M Cattle Company thran had 
been given originally to the Group operating Mc-
Farlands in May. 
In the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 
Section 41, page 49, it is provided: 
"Revocation of an offer may be made by 
a comtnunication from offeror received by 
offeree , which states or implies ·that the offer-
or no longer intends to enter into proposed 
contract, if the communication is received by 
the offeree before he has exercised his power 
of creating a contract by acceptance of the 
offer." 
As the written offer and agreement made be-
tween Goldring Packing Company and H & M Cattle 
Company required as an ·additional condition of H 
& M C1attle Company to m·aking an agreement th'at 
it get the personal indemnity of the various indem-
nitors, it appears that an additional condition was 
attached to making a deal with H & M Cattle Com-
pany than what was attached to making a. deal or 
agreement with the Group operat'ing McF·arlands 
in May, 1961. 
Further, it would apear that the refusal of H 
& M Cattle Company to sign the written agreement 
to kill ewes or sheep for 50 cents per head would 
haYe been a communication of a rejection to the oral 
proposal in May, 1961, and such a rejection would 
have destroyed the original May offer as a matter 
of law. 
In Hargrave vs. Heard Investment Co. (1940) 
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56 Ariz. 77, 105 P. 2d 520, the court held when one 
with whom another offers to enter into a contract 
on certain terms declines to 1accept such terms, but 
offers a counter proposition, then the original offer 
loses i!ts effect and may thereafter be accepted by 
the offeree only when renewed by the offeror. 
It is submitted that the refusal to sign the writ-
ten agreement to kill sheep for 50 cents per head 
was a rejection of the May offer, 1as this agreement 
was signed in August after being discussed in June 
and July, and constituted a rejection as a matter of 
law, and that thereafter, as a matter of law, there is 
no evidence to show the offer was ever orally re-
newed. 
As a general rule, parties are not continued to 
negotiate and bargain and then insist th1at original 
offer remains open for acceptance. 
In Drennan vs. Star Paving Company (1958) 
51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P. 2d 757, the Supreme Court of 
California held a general contractor could not re-
open bargaining with a subcontractor and at the 
same time continue a right to accept the original 
offer of the subcontractor. The California court 
said: 
"It bears noting that a general contract-
or is not free to ·delay acceptance after he has 
·been awarded the general contract in hope of 
getting a better price. Nor can he reopen 
bargaining with the subcontractor and at the 
same time claim a continuing right to accept 
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the original offer. See R. J. Daum Construc-
tion Co. vs. Child, Utah, 24 7 P. 2d 817, 823, 
* * * " . 
In order to convert an offer into a conti'Iact, 
there must be an acceptance of the offer before it is 
withdrawn. Continued existence of an offer until 
accepted is necessary to make possible the forma-
tion of a contract. Further, in Drennan vs. StJar 
Pa·vi-ng Company, Supra, the California court said 
that if knowledge of facts inconsistent with the con-
tinuance of the offer is brought ·home to the offeree, 
the offer cannot be accepted. 
In Hoover Motor Express Company, Inc. vs. 
Clements Paper Company, ( 19'51) 193 Tenn. 6, ·241 
S.W. 2d 851, where prior to acceptance of a written 
offer, the offeror, by telephone, told the ·offeree 
that 'he didn't think ·he woul'd be going through with 
the proposal and that he had other plans in mind, 
the court held the offeree had knowled'ge the offer 
was withdrawn 1and was no longer continuing, and 
an attempted acceptance hereafter was ineffective 
to form a binding contract. 
The continued bargaining between Goldring 
Packing Company 'and H & M Cattle Company in 
July and August of 1961 shows as a matter of law 
the May offer, even if it could be construed to be 
made to H & M Cattle Company as an offeree, was 
not open for 'acceptance. It is submitted that since 
the memorandum agreement of August, 1961 (Ex-
hibit 5) s·hows Goldring was bargaining in July and 
23 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
August for a written agreement containing the addi-
tional conditions as follows, 
1. To make H & M Cattle Company its agent 
to purchase cattle for Goldring. 
2. To make H & M Cattle Company obli-
gated to slaughter cattle for $3.00 per head. 
3. To make H & M Cattle Company sell beef 
for Goldring. 
4. To m1ake H & M Cattle Company guaran-
tee certain beef prices as provided weekly by 
Goldring to H & M Cattle Company. 
5. To make H & M Ca:ttle Company hold 
Goldring Packing Company harmless from all 
claims of every nature. 
6. To provide that H & M C~attle Company 
furnis·h fire and extended coverage insurance 
to Goldring Packing Company. 
7. To make H & M Cattle Company provide 
indemnitors to guarantee its ability to per-
form with Goldring, 
that as a matter of law, the dealings of the parties 
after May, 1961 s·how a rejection of the May offer 
by both parties concerned, and there was no meet-
ing of the minds on any oral agreement. Definitely, 
the future dealings of the parties in July and Aug-
ust show the oral offer of May, 1961 was not un .. 
conditionally accepted. 
From the conduct of the parties, it is obvious 
that if anything, the May oral offer was a prelim-
inary offer only, and that thereafter, it was not 
seriously considered by Goldring Packing Company 
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or H & M Cattle Company until it was definitely 
learned at the time of the Pretrial a ewe could not 
be construed to be a lamb. 
POINT III. 
THE CONDU'CT OR 8ILE·NCE OF H & M CATTLE 
COMPANY, OR ITS OFFICERS, AT THE MAY, 1961 
CONFEREN·CE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, DID NOT 
MAKE AN ORAL CONTRACT. 
N'O where in his testimony did IMr. Hendler say 
the H & M Cattle Company or a.ny one of its repre-
sentatives said they would kill sheep or ewes for 50 
cents a head. He did, however, imply H & M C·attle 
Company accepted his offer to the Group because 
the officers of H & M Cattle Company were present 
when he made the offer to the Group. 
In this appeal H & M Cattle ·Company con'tends 
that since an oral offer was not made to it as offeree, 
the silence or conduct of its officers at the ~eeting 
in May of 1961 did not constitute an accep'tance of 
an oral offer. 
In 17 C.J. S. Con tvacts, Section 41, it is stated 
that as a general rule silence does not constitute an 
acceptance of an offer. In 17 C.J.S. Contrac'ts, Sec-
tion 41, it is provided: 
~'As a general rule, mere silen·ce does not 
constitute an acceptance of an offer. Silence 
alone does not give consent, even by estoppel, 
since there must not only be the right, but 
the duty, to speak before the failure to do 
so can estop a person afterward to set up the 
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truth, particularly where the silence or in-
action has an uncertain or ambiguous mean-
ing and the parties have reasoniable differing 
views as to what the fact meant. It is other-
wise if the relationship of the parties, their 
previous dealings, or other circumstances are 
such as to impose a duty to speak; and, if 
in such a case the offeree is silent or his in-
action conveys but one reasonable meaning, 
intentional assent on his part is not a requi-
site. 
"An offer made to another, either orally 
or in writing, cannot be turned into an agree-
ment merely because the person to whom it is 
m·ade or sent makes no reply, even though the 
offer states that silence will be taken as con-
sent, for the offeror cannot prescribe the con-
ditions of the rejection so as to turn silence 
on the part of the offeree into an acceptance, 
unless the offeree has previously agreed that 
silence shall be so construed. Thus, it has 
been said tha:t silence will not amount to the 
:acceptance of an offer unless it is expressly 
so agreed. 
"In like manner, mere delay in accepting 
or rejecting an offer cannot make an agree-
ment, unless the circumstances :are such as to 
impose a duty to reply." 
It is su;bmitted, as a m·atter of law, since the 
offer was made to ·~he Group, an·d not to H & M 
Cattle Company, that its officers, although members 
of the Group, had no duty to speak up or affirma-
tively reject the offer. 
In Suitter vs. Thompson (1960) 2'25 Ore. 614, 
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:358 P. 2d 267, where the plaintiff was silent when 
one of the defendants made an offer to pay plaintiff 
for his interest in a mine, 1/20th of interest of the 
defendants in royalties from mine for a period of 
five years, the court held silence did not constitute 
an acceptance where there was no showing of any 
right to demand some action by the plaintiff, even 
though plainti'ff received and accepted a check. Fur-
ther, the court said in Suitter vs. Thompson, Supra. 
an acceptan~ce of an offer ;by silence can only arise 
when circumstances existing are such th·at a ·duty 
arises requiring the offeree to speak, and ·a duty 
to speak can only arise when offeror has a right to 
demand some action on the part of the offeree. 
What right did Goldring P·acking Comp·any 
haYe to dem:and of H & M C·a:ttle ~complany after 
the May conference that it kill ·ewes for '50 cents 
per head? 
It would appear that since it had no right to 
demand from H & M Cattle ·Comp·any that it kill 
ewes for 50 cents a head, there would be no duty 
to spe·ak on the part of H & M Cattle Company. 
In llfacy vs. Day (1961) Mo. App., 346 S.W. 
2d 555, the court held to make a valid contract, the 
parties must have a distinct intention, common to 
both, and without doubt in difference, and their 
minds must meet upon the assent to the same thing 
in the same sense at the same time. 
It is submitted that since H & M Cattle Com-
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pany was not operating the plant in May that the 
intention of its officers to assent to the offer of Mr. 
Hendler did not occur. 
In Kimball Elevator Company vs. Elevator Sup-
plies Company (1954) 2 Utah 2d 289, 272 P. 2d 
583, where :an a~tion was brought for bre·ach of an 
alleged agreement not to compete in bidding, and 
where the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, 
and where both parties had been in the business for 
years, and where it had been the practice of Kim-
ball to subcontract from Elevator Supplies Company, 
and w·here in the past, Kim~ba1l had accepted Eleva-
tor Supplies Company's bid, and where Kimball's 
man'ager requested a sub-bid from Elevator Sup-
plies Company for modernizin'g elevators at the 
Hotel Utah, an·d bid was furnished, and where there-
after, the Hotel Utah requested a bid ·directly from 
Elevator Supplies Company, and thereafter that bid 
was accepted, and where after, when the plaintiff 
did not get job, it claimed first that Elevator Sup-
plies Company owed 'it ia commission for helping it 
get the job, and second, that when this was rejected, 
it had a cause of action for breach of an implied 
agreement not to compete, and where witness for 
the plaintiff said it was his impression that second 
bid was check bid only and would be higher, natur-
ally, as it was out of San Francisco, and where this 
testimony was objected to as an impression rather 
than a fact, and where the court said the testimony 
was improperly ;admitted because the witness was 
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giving impressions, not fact, and where this court 
said: 
"Even if this testimony had been elicited 
in such a manner to be competent, that is a 
statement made by Roy Smith, at best it would 
have shown only that he knew that the plain-
tiff wanted Elevator Supplies to make a check 
bid, but would have fallen far short of 
amounting to a promise that his Company 
would do so. 
"l't is of course conceded that ·a contract 
may be made out even though there be no ex-
press words formally stating it, 1and tha:t the 
promise may be inferred wholly or in part 
from such conduct as justifies the promisee in 
understanding that the promisor intended to 
make it. Nevertheless we fail to see how, tak-
ing all of the evidence and every reasonable 
inference th:at m·ay fairly be derived there-
from in the light most favorable to the ·plain-
'tiff, as we are obliged to do, a findin·g that 
Elevator Supplies made suc~h promise in the 
instant case can be supported. Likewise, we 
find no circumstances here from which it 
could be reason:ably concluded th·at silence or 
inaction with respect to such request amount-
ed to an acceptance." 
I't appears fuat the testimony of Mr. Hendler 
in May of 1961 merely shows 'that his Company 
wanted sheep killed for 50 cents per head 1and that 
the action or inaction on the part of the H & M 
Cattle Company officers at the meeting fell far short 
of amounting to a promise to kill sheep, even thou·gh 
he was under the impression they agreed, as iafter 
all, the test of a true interpretation of an accept-
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ance is not what a party making it thought it meant 
or intended it to mean, but what reasonable persons 
in the position of the parties would have thought it 
meant, Ray vs. William G. Eurice & Brothers ( 1952) 
201 Md. 115, 93 Atl. 2d 2'7·2. 
POINT IV. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED PREJUDICALLY IN 
A:DMITTING HEARSAY EVIDENCE. 
The truth of the statement that Goldring Pack-
ing ·Company was asserting at the trial was that 
in May of 1961 it made ·an oral contract with H & M 
Cattle Company to kill ewes for 50 cents per head. 
Goldring Packing Company's direct oral evi-
dence s·howed an oral agreement was made with the 
Group operatin·g McFarland's plant, but showed no 
direct oral agreement with H & M Cattle Company. 
To bridge the gap between the Group operating the 
plant and H & M Cattle Company, Goldring Pack-
ing Company offered, and the Lower Court received, 
Exhibit 2. ·This exhibit consisted of seven billings 
from H & M Cattle Company to Goldring Packing 
Company in whi·ch it billed a few ewes or sheep at 
50 cents per head. 
The defendant, Great Western Packing and 
Cattle Company, objected to this exhibit being re-
ceived by the Lower Court on the ground the exhi-
bit was hearsay to prove the truth of an oral con-
tract ma·de in May of 1961, but the exhibit was re-
ceived by the Lower Court over Great Western Pack-
ing and C·attle Company's objection. Thereafter, 
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plaintiff's counsel used the exhibit to argue that 
if a few ewes or sheep were billed out at 50 cents 
·a head, it certainly was true that there was an oral 
contract made in May. 
Mr. Dennis W. Couch, the man who prepared 
the billings in Exhibit 2, was available as a witness, 
and after the admittance of Exhibit 2, he was called 
and testified .that he was employed during July, 
August and September at the McFarland Plant, re-
ceiving his pay check from McFarlan·d's, and that 
he was employed as an office man·ager an'd collec-
tions manager, and that he prepared the second, 
third, fourth, and fifth billings of the seven billings 
in Exhibit 2. He said that h·e had billed the sheep 
out at 50 cents only be·cause he knew ·fuat was the 
figure he was going to get, and that he needed 
money, as they were short on ·working capital to 
meet the payroll. Further, he testified th!at he 'had 
not received any specific instructions to bill ewes 
at 50 cents a head, but knew this was the sum they 
were getting for lambs, and then on ·his own, with~ 
out any authorization, he billed a few ewes at 50 
cents, saying he knew they would ·be ~llowe'd at 50 
cents a head but did not know how much more on 
the ewes. He also said that ·he knew there had to be 
a difference in the price between killing ewes and 
lambs, but that he did not know whether or not 
there was a contract covering the killing of ewes, 
but that 'he did know there was a contract for the 
killing of lambs at 50 cents per head. 
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In th·e Handbook of the Law of Evidence by 
Charles T. McCormick at p!age 460, hearsay evi-
dence is defined as follows: 
"With these warnings, the following 
is proposed. Hearsay evidence is testimony in 
court or written evidence, of a statement 
made out of court, such evidence being of-
fered as an assertion to show the truth of 
matters !asserted therein, and thus resting 
for its value upon the credibility of the out 
of court asserter. '' 
T1he principal reason for excluding hearsay is 
namely, the want of the right of confrontation in 
cross examination to· ~determine the credibility of 
the out of court declarant. 
In. this particular case, if Mr. Saperstein had 
had to produce Mr. Couch as his witness and on 
cross examin!ation it had been shown that he did 
not know of any oral contract to kill ewes for fifty 
cents, his credibility as to the price would have 
made his testimony valueless. 
Of course, if the billings h·ad been offered to 
prove a written agreement in July to kill ewes for 
50 cents, no one would contend that would be hear-
say to prove a written :agreement. 
There are many instances of the exclusion of 
written statements as hearsay when offered in court 
as eviden'ce of the truth of an asserted fact. 
In Heil vs. Zahn (1947) 187 Md. 603, 51 Atl. 
2d 17 4, where a suit was brought by a nurse against 
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a decedent's estate for services, the decedent's writ-
ten di1·ections to his executors stating that he owed 
no debts was excluded as hearsay: 
Doctors written medical reports on their find-
ings as to treatment and examinations !are gener-
ally held to be hearsay, and in Dier vs. Dier (1942) 
141 Neb. 685, 4 N.W. 2d 7·31, where in a divorce 
suit the report of an investigator, acting at the re-
quest of the court pursuant to statute, of interviews 
with parties, report was us·ed, and circumstances 
where the party ~ffering the repqrt offered 'to pro-
duce for cross ex-amination the investigator and the 
persons interviewed, tll·e court held, nevertheless, 
the use of the report was hearsay and error. 
In R1tssell vs. Ogden Union Railway & Depot 
Company (1952) 122 Utah 107, 2417 P. 2d 257, 
\Vhere an action· WaS brough't by an employee for 
alleged 'vrongful discharge by the Railroad, and 
where the employee's statement contained in the 
transcript given in the ·hearing :before the Railway's 
~ssistant superintendent a statement that the em-
ployee had been too sick to apply for leave of ab-
sence, it was held that the use of the report was 
hearsay :and ina-dmissable as proof of illness. 
In Montana in Shillingstad vs. Nelson (1963) 
141 )font. 412, 378 P. 2d 393, where the court at the 
request of plaintiff's counsel admitted a written 
n1edical report of an examination made by defend-
ant's doctor over objection, the court held ~admission 
of the medical report was hearsay and not within 
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the rule of an· exception to the hears·ay rule, and that 
it was preju'dicial error to admit the report where the 
doctor was not called as a witness. 
In Gifford vs. York (1950) 14·5 Me. 397, 74 
Atl. 2d 878, Where the court excluded a receipt given 
by a third party purporting to cover a commission 
for sale of property, the court held excluding 'tfue re-
ceipt was not error because it was hearsay, particu-
larly where 'the party giving the receipt was in the 
courtroom !an\d not called as a witness. 
In the principal ·case, Mr. Couch was available 
as a witness. 
In Hunter vs. Totman (1951) 146 Me. 259, 80 
Atl. 2d 401, where the court refused to admit inven-
tory notebook in a case where the seller sued the 
buyer of pota:toes and where seller's claim was based 
on inventory in notebook kept by a person who had 
no personal knowledge of number of barrels of po-
tatoes from seeing either slips or tickets, the court 
held it was reversible error to admit the inadmis-
sible notebook, and in granting a new trial said : 
"'Our court has decided that where the 
entries in a book of accounts do not itemize 
the transactions recorded, an'd comprise the 
details of several trans·actions, the book is not 
·:admissible as independent evidence. Putman 
vs. Grant, 101 Me. 240, 63 Atl. 816. State-
ments of the plaintiff himself or of third per-
sons, such as invoices, bills of lading or pro-
tests, are not admissible. Paine vs. Maine 
Mutual Marine Insurance Co., 6'9 Me. 568." 
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In Nalder vs. Kellogg Sales Co. (1957) 6 Utah 
2d 367, 314 I). 2d 350, where trial court admitted 
profit and loss statements, this court reversed the 
trial court for committing prejudicial error saying 
the exhibit was not shown to have been prepared, 
nor was it presented by a person competent to do 
so who was subject to cross-examination; nor was 
it based on records or other data available for ex-
amination, other than the exhibit herein mentioned. 
Further, in N.alder vs. K.ellog Sales Co., Supra., the 
court said the correct rule was stated in Sprague 
vs. Boyles Brothers Drilling Co., 4 Utah 2d 344, a;t 
page '3'5'2, 1294 P. 2d 689 at page 694. 
In Sprague vs. Boyles Brothers Drilling Co. 
(1956) 4 Utah 2d 344, 294 P. 2d 68'9, the court said 
regarding admission of numerous work sheets: 
''It has been held, and we believe the rul-
ing to be a salutary and expe!dien't one, th~at 
where origin·al book entries, documents, or 
other data ~are so numerous, complex or cum-
bersome that they cannot be conveniently ex-
amined by the trier of fact, or where it would 
materially aid the court and p·arties in an-
alyzing such material, that !a competent per-
son who has made suC'h examination may pre-
sent such evidence. This is subject to ·~he limi-
tation that the evidence must be shown to be 
developed from records, ·books or documents, 
the competency of which has been established, 
and the records must be available for exain-
ination by the opposing parties and the wit-
nesses subject to cross examination concern-
ing such evidence." 
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In the principal case it is submitted, since Mr. 
Couch admitted he had no knowl'edge of an oral 
contract to kill ewes or sheep for 50 cents per he:ad, 
that any evidence contained in fue billings was not 
developed from a competent source, and that as a 
matter of law, the billings should have been excluded. 
Further, since 'Mr. Couch testified he didn't know 
the terms of the contract or if there was a contract 
for k~lling ewes ( R. 258) and said he never re-
ceived. any specific instructions about killing ewes 
or billing for killing ewes ( R. ·254), an'd did not 
know of the ·arrangements between the parties for 
k:illing ewes, it would appear that the billings in 
Exhi1bit 2 were no't written within fue scope of his 
authority to speak or write for H & M C!attle ·Com-
pany, and it is submitted they were not admissible 
as ·admissions of a representative n·ature. 
In John C. Cutler Association vs. De Jay Store.f) 
(195'5) 3 Utah 2d 107, 279 P. 2d 700, where an 
objeetion was made on the ground the !answer would 
be ·hearsay when a witness was asked what was the 
amount of the bid, this court sustained the exclu-
sion· of -the testimony as hearsay, since ifuere was no 
proper foundation for its admission. 
POINT V. 
THE ·C·ON·CLUSION OF A WITNESS IS NOT COM-
PETENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE AN ORAL CON-
TRA·CT. 
To prove the oral contract Mr. Saperstein, the 
attorney for Goldring Packing Company, did not 
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ask Mr. Hendler what he said or what was said 
oo him by officers or employees of H & M Cattle 
Company. Rather, he 'asked for Mr. Hendler's con-
clusion as to what the agreed price was and a proper 
objection was made ( R. 171). Repeatedly, Mr. 
Hendler tried to testify they agreed or there was 
a complete agreement, but he never did state wh:at 
\Vas said. In fact, Mr. Hendler said Mr. McFarland, 
Who was not an officer or employee of the H & M 
Cattle Company engaged to make contr~acts, did most 
of the talking and that they accepted individually 
and collectively, and said he could not specifically say 
that Mr. Morgan said yes, and the others did not S'ay 
anything, saying that he did not know. Whenever 
1\'lr. Hendler was asked a question :about what was 
said as to the price, he would just say 'that they 
agreed among themselves, ·giving ·his conclusion. 
The only individuals Mr. Hendler recalled saying 
anything to him on the price were Mr. Leonard 
Thayer, the president of McFarlands Incorporated 
at the time of the conference. in May, and Mr. Ray 
McFarland, another officer of iMcFarlands. With 
regard to Mr. Jerry Morgan, this question was asked 
(R. 188). 
Q. You don't recall specifically of Mr. Jerry 
Morgan saying he would kill these for fifty 
cents? 
... \. No, I can not remember that far back so 
far as the individuals are concerned. 
In this appeal the Great Western Packing and 
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Oattle Company contends the testimony of Mr. Hend-
ler merely showed his state of mind or conclusion, 
and '~hat it was not competent to prove an oral con-
tract because he a·dmitted he did not know what 
Jerry Morgan or any other representative of the 
H & M Cattle ·Comp:any said about the price for 
killing ewes. 
It was quite evident at the trial when Mr. Sap-
erstein abruptly changed the subject of conversa-
tion from over-time kill on Saturd·ay to the agreed 
price for killing sheep, that he wanted to get a con-
clusion out of 'Mr. Hendler before a timely objec-
tion could b·e m:ade by defendant's counsel (R. 174). 
The question sta~ting at the top of page R. 17 4 was 
like this: 
Q. Belonged to the Goldring Packing Com-
pany, is that corre'Ct? 
A. That is correct; and we sold them locally 
here to a compiany called Summerhays. 
Q. Was there any conversation at this time 
with respect to any charges for overtime kill 
or Saturday kill? 
A. Not at that time. 
And now comes the quick question asking for a con-
clusion: 
Q. And just to be cetrain that you indicated 
to the jury, sir, iat what price did they agree 
to kill sheep for you? 
And a very quick answer : 
A. Fifty cents per head. 
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, I object to that 
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question as calling for a conclusion. I think 
the question should ask what the officers said; 
I don't think he should ·ask what they agreed 
to. 
Further, the record shows that he always said 
there was an agreement or they agreed, and never 
said what, and of course, each time I objected, the 
jury felt I was being unfair in not letting Mr. Hend-
ler give his con'clusion or state of mind, and it is 
submitted the jury is ~always prejudiced against the 
objector because it does not understand the reason-
ing behind the taking of the objection, and does 
not realize that as a matter of law on appeal you 
will lose on the record if you don't take the objection, 
and merely thinks, "Th1at lawyer has got something 
to hide, so let's not let him do it." 
In Kimball Elevator Company vs. Elevator Sup-
plies Company (1954) 2 Utah 2'd 289, ·2·72 P. 2d 
583, where the witness for the plaintiff testified 
that it was his im~pression second bid was c-heck 
bid only, and an objection was taken as to his con-
clusion or impression, as it was called, our cou:rt 
said the witness' testim·ony was improperly admit-
ted because the witness was giving an impression 
and not a fact ,and that the testimony was not eli-
cited in a competent manner. 
In Dansak vs. Delttke ( 1961) 12 Utah 2d 302, 
366 P. 2d 67, where proper testimony was objected 
to upon the ground that it would be hearsay, and 
'vhere the offer of proof was as follows: 
"Mr. Pace, I \vill state that Mr. Kenyon 
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will testify. He had examined and satisfied 
himself in talking to the men in this corpora-
tion they were transferring all of their legal 
obligations of Mr. Lewis Deluke for Lucy 
Deluke, signing 'her property to the corpora-
tion, and he advised there was no problem in 
the transaction, and he advised his client to 
go ahead with this agreement." 
This court said the proper proof was properly ex-
cluded, as it merely showed a state of mind and did 
not definitely state the facts sought to be proved. 
It is proposed that the testimony of Mr. Hend-
ler was not elicited in a competent manner to prove 
an oral contract, and that no or~al contract was 
proven because he failed to state facts showing Mr. 
Jerry Morgan or any other in.dividual representing 
H & M Cattle Company would kill ewes for 50 
cents !a head. 
CON'CLUSION 
The judgment of the Lower Court should be 
reversed and a new trial should be granted solely 
upon the issue of what was the reasonable value 
of the service of Great Western Packing and Cattle 
Company in killing the ewes for Goldring Packing 
Company. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND M. BERRY 
Attorney for Dejendant-AppelZant 
Great Western Packing & 
Cattle Co. 
203 Executive Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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I hereby certify that on this ---------------- day of 
......... ·-··-···-·-·---------------, 1964, I mailed two copies of 
this Brief by United States mail, postage prepaid, 
to Herschel J. Saperstein, Louis M. Haynie, and 
Barker and Ryberg, Attorneys at Law, at the ad-
dresses shown on the cover of this Brief. 
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